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The thesis that agents should calibrate their beliefs in the face of higher-order
evidence—i.e., should adjust their first-order beliefs in response to evidence
suggesting that the reasoning underlying those beliefs is faulty—is sometimes
thought to be in tension with Bayesian approaches to belief update: in order
to obey Bayesian norms, it’s claimed, agents must remain steadfast in the face
of higher-order evidence. But I argue that this claim is incorrect. In particular,
I motivate a minimal constraint on a reasonable treatment of the evolution
of self-locating beliefs over time and show that calibrationism is compatible
with any generalized Bayesian approach that respects this constraint. I then
use this result to argue that remaining steadfast isn’t the response to higher-
order evidence that maximizes expected accuracy.
1 Introduction
Higher-order defeat—i.e., defeat by evidence suggesting that some of one’s own be-
liefs have been produced by faulty reasoning—is sometimes thought to be a source
of tension with Bayesian approaches to belief update. Consider, for instance, a ver-
sion of the classic case of the pilot who discovers she’s hypoxic:
The Hypoxic Pilot. Aisha is flying a plane at 10 am onMonday, and the evidence
she’s gained since 8 pm on Sunday, before her flight, is E ∧ D. E is evidence of the
usual kind, and Aisha, on doing some calculations based on E, reaches the ver-
dict that H is true, where H is the proposition that she has enough fuel to reach
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an airstrip much farther away than her original destination. In the usual circum-
stances, this verdict would induce her to become highly confident in H. But these
aren’t the usual circumstances: Aisha also has the evidence D, which, though it
doesn’t bear directly on H in any way, does indicate that she’s suffering from hy-
poxia, a condition that occurs at high altitudes and diminishes pilots’ ability to
reason in such a way that, when they do calculations like the one she’s just done,
they commit random errors in such a way that the verdicts they reach are correct
only half the time. As it happens, though, Aisha, in this case, has completed the
calculations correctly.1
According to an exceedingly plausible view known as calibrationism, rationality
requires that Aisha’s confidence inH, on gaining E along with the higher-order ev-
idenceD, be significantly lower than it would have been had she gained only E—to
fail to calibrate her beliefs in this way would be to continue to insist on the correct-
ness of her calculations despite her knowledge that they’re hypoxia-affected, and
this sort of insistence, it seems, would amount to nothing more than pigheaded
refusal to acknowledge the dangerous nature of her situation. On the face of it,
though, calibrating in this way would require violating conditionalization.2 Let the
probability function pS model Aisha’s belief state at 8 pm on Sunday.Then pS(H ∣ E)
is extremely high. Furthermore, it should be the case that pS(H ∣ E∧D) = pS(H ∣ E);
the supposition that Aisha will get evidence indicating she’s hypoxic on Monday
should make no difference to her confidence in her calculations on Sunday, when
she knows she’s not hypoxic. pS(H ∣ E ∧D), then, should be extremely high as well.
(Note that she need not actually do any calculations on Sunday—her conditional
credences may simply be, for example, abstractions from her dispositions. Indeed,
if she does do the relevant calculations on Sunday, we must stipulate, in order for
the case to have its intended force, that one of the effects of hypoxia is to distort
one’s memories of previous calculations of this sort in such a way that they are no
longer to be trusted. Otherwise, she could remain confident inH despite gainingD
just by relying on her memory of the calculations she did on Sunday, without need-
ing to rely on any hypoxia-affected calculations.) So, if rationality requires that she
calibrate—i.e., if pM(H) should not be extremely high, where pM models her be-
lief state at 10 am on Monday, after she has gained E ∧ D—then pM(H) should
be less than pS(H ∣ E ∧ D), which means rationality requires that she violate con-
ditionalization. Our exceedingly plausible calibrationist view, then, appears to be
straightforwardly incompatible with Bayesianism.
1For early discussions of this case, see Adam Elga (2008) and David Christensen (2010b). I’ve
chosen to focus on this case so that I can more easily emphasize the points of contact between my
discussion and that of Miriam Schoenfield (2018), who also focuses on a version of it.
2Thephenomenonherewas, as far as I know, first pointed out byChristensen (2010a: 199–200).
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It gets worse. We know that, insofar as what Aisha cares about is accuracy, she
should take conditionalizing to be the optimal response to new evidence—this is
an immediate consequence of Hilary Greaves and David Wallace’s (2006) proof
that conditionalization uniquely maximizes expected accuracy. (We assume here,
as usual, that Aisha assigns accuracy scores in a strictly proper way—i.e., in such
a way that every probabilistically coherent credence function turns out to be self-
recommending, in the sense that it expects itself to be more accurate than alterna-
tive credence functions.) So, insofar as she should calibrate (and so should violate
conditionalization), rationality requires that she not maximize expected accuracy.
It appears then, that calibrationism, in virtue of its incompatibility with Bayesian-
ism, is also incompatible with the accuracy-first program in epistemology.
What’s the lesson here? We might suppose that, in order to maintain compat-
ibility with Bayesianism and the accuracy-first program, we should simply aban-
don calibrationism in favor of the view that, whatever higher-order evidence Aisha
gains, the rational thing for her to do is to remain steadfast in her beliefs.3 But this
would be hasty—there’s reason to suspect that, despite appearances, Bayesianism
and calibrationism can be reconciled. The thought is that the incompatibility here
is merely apparent, an artifact of our failure to take adequate account of a category
of belief that, as Christensen (2010a) points out, plays a crucial role in cases of
higher-order defeat: self-locating belief.When Aisha gainsD onMonday, she gains
evidence suggesting that her present belief state is the product of hypoxia-affected
reasoning—D is evidence about her reasoning capacities at 10 am on Monday and
so tells her something about the situation she’s in now. But this is only because she
knows that it’s now 10 am on Monday: when she’s sitting at home at 8 pm on Sun-
day (and knows that she is), the supposition that she’ll gain D when she’s flying on
Monday, even if it’s true, suggests nothing at all about her present belief state. The
mismatch between what pS(H ∣ E∧D) should be and what pM(H) should be, then,
is closely connected to the fact that Aisha’s self-locating beliefs evolve significantly
between Sunday and Monday. Furthermore, it’s well known that self-locating be-
liefs make trouble for the conditionalization principle, which wasn’t designed with
such beliefs in mind. For instance, to lose certainty is to violate conditionalization
(as standardly formulated), but an agent might, without irrationality, lose certainty
in the belief that it’s 12:30, just because some time has passed.4 It would be natu-
ral, then, to suspect that “when we fully understand how belief updating works in
contexts where self-locating beliefs are important, we will see that HOE-involving
cases can be accommodated in a formal account of belief updating which preserves
a general matching between present credences on the supposition that E, and fu-
3Versions of this view are defended by, e.g., Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), Michael Titelbaum
(2015), Brian Weatherson (2019: chap. 11), and Daniel Whiting (2019).
4See, e.g., Frank Arntzenius (2003) and Christopher Hitchcock (2004).
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ture credences on learning just E” (Christensen 2010a: 201)—i.e., that a Bayesian
approach, appropriately generalized so as to provide a reasonable framework for
handling the evolution of self-locating beliefs, will prove to be compatible with cal-
ibrationism after all.
I argue here that this suspicion is correct. In particular, I introduce andmotivate
a minimal constraint on a reasonable treatment of the dynamics of self-locating
belief, and then I show that any Bayesian approach that can meet this constraint
will thereby be compatible with calibrationism.
Even if this is correct, though, there’s an additional worry. Greaves and Wal-
lace, recall, have shown that conditionalization is the update procedure that maxi-
mizes expected accuracy. But their result doesn’t straightforwardly apply in cases
where self-locating beliefs are important: they rely on a framework in which the ob-
jects of credence are propositions understood as sets of possible worlds, and such
propositions can’t encode self-locating information at all. So even if a Bayesian
approach, appropriately generalized to handle self-location, is compatible with cal-
ibrationism, there remains the question of whether updating in accordance with
this approach’s recommendations will turn out to maximize expected accuracy.
And indeed, Schoenfield (2018) suggests that it won’t: she argues that what maxi-
mizes accuracy, when self-locating beliefs are in play, isn’t conditionalization but
an alternative procedure, one that’s itself incompatible with calibrationism. If this
is right, then we must either give up calibrationism or abandon the accuracy-first
program in epistemology.5
As we’ll see, though, this further worry is answerable: Schoenfield’s argument
notwithstanding, updating in accordance with the recommendations of a suitably
generalized Bayesian approach does maximize expected accuracy. In fact, when
we take proper account of the dynamics of self-location, it becomes clear that the
accuracy-first program, far frombeing incompatible with calibrationism,motivates
that view. So what we have, in the end, is an accuracy-based argument for cali-
brationism along with an assurance that endorsing this view doesn’t require us to
abandon a Bayesian approach to belief update.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in §2 with a critical discussion of
Schoenfield’s argument that calibration fails to maximize expected accuracy. Then,
based on this discussion, §3 introduces and motivates a minimal constraint on an
adequate treatment of the dynamics of self-location. §4 explains why any gener-
5Schoenfield (2015, 2018) introduces a nonstandard picture of the connection between ex-
pected accuracy and the rational status of update procedures and suggests that adopting this picture
will allow us to “deliver an accuracy based argument for calibrating” (2018: 711). But this, I argue
in my (forthcoming), is incorrect: Schoenfield’s alternative picture turns out always to agree with
the standard picture about what update procedure is rational, and so, whatever other reasons there
may be for adopting Schoenfield’s picture, doing so will be of no help in resolving the apparent
incompatibility between calibrationism and the accuracy-first program.
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alized Bayesian approach that can meet this constraint will thereby be compatible
with calibrationism, and §§5–6 provide, on this basis, an accuracy-based argument
for calibrating. Finally, we conclude in §7 with a brief discussion of a surprising im-
plication of the picture at which we’ve arrived, an implication that bears on another
debate about the dynamics of self-location.
2 Schoenfield’s argument
On Schoenfield’s gloss, Christensen’s claim about the importance of self-locating
beliefs in cases of higher-order defeat amounts, when applied to Aisha’s case, to
the claim that Aisha’s higher-order evidence is not to be understood as the ordi-
nary proposition D but as a centered proposition Dc, a self-locating proposition
Aisha would express using some sentence like “I’m hypoxic now” (2018: 698). The
resulting explanation of why Aisha can calibrate without violating conditionaliza-
tion is simple:Dc, as evaluated by Aisha at 8 pm on Sunday, is true just in case she’s
hypoxic at 8 pm on Sunday. (A centered proposition is here understood as a set,
not of possible worlds, but of centered worlds, where a centered world is a triple
consisting of a possible world, an agent, and a time.) So at 8 pm on Sunday, she
should believe, on supposing Dc, that her present belief state is indeed the product
of hypoxia-affected reasoning. We can plausibly claim, then, that pS(H ∣ E ∧ Dc)
should be less than pS(H ∣ E), in which case calibrating doesn’t require violating
conditionalization after all.
The problem with this explanation, says Schoenfield, is that, insofar as the evi-
dence Aisha gains between 8 pm on Sunday and 10 am on Monday is indeed E∧Dc,
conditionalizing on that evidence fails to maximize expected accuracy. Schoen-
field’s argument begins with the observation that Greaves and Wallace’s proof that
conditionalizing on one’s evidencemaximizes expected accuracy relies on a certain
assumption about about what the agent knows about her future evidence. Where
P is an evidence proposition an agent might gain on undergoing a learning experi-
ence over a particular period of time, let L(P) be the proposition that the evidence
the agent gains, on undergoing the learning experience in question, is P. Then
Greaves and Wallace’s assumption is that the agent satisfies the following condi-
tion:
Evidential Completeness. Before undergoing the learning experience in ques-
tion, the agent is certain that, for any evidence P she might gain, P↔ L(P).6
6On Schoenfield’s presentation, there are two conditions that need to be satisfied, which she
calls Partitionality and Factivity. But she proves (in her 2018: app. 1 and also, with additional com-
mentary, in her 2017: sec. 2) that the conjunction of these two conditions is equivalent to Evidential
Completeness.
higher-order evidence and the dynamics of self-location 6
In other words, conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy only on the as-
sumption that the agent is certain that, for any evidence proposition P she might
gain on undergoing a learning experience over a particular period of time, she’ll
gainP just in case it’s true. (This assumption derives its plausibility from the thought
that an ideal agent can be sure that the truth values of evidence propositions will
be transparent to her, perhaps because evidence propositions will always be propo-
sitions about her own experience. It seems that all parties to the discussion here
are willing to accept this thought, at least for the sake of argument.) Without this
assumption, Schoenfield explains, what can be shown is that the procedure that
maximizes expected accuracy is a procedure she calls conditionalization*, which
amounts to conditionalizing not on P itself but on L(P).7 That is, in the general
case, the agent, in order to maximize expected accuracy, should conditionalize not
on the evidence proposition P but on the proposition that the evidence she gains is
P. (In cases where Evidential Completeness is satisfied, the agent takes P and L(P)
to be equivalent, which means conditionalization and conditionalization* come
to the same thing. This is why conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy in
these cases.)
This doesn’t yet show that conditionalization fails to maximize expected accu-
racy in cases of higher-order defeat—conditionalization fails tomaximize expected
accuracy only if the agent doesn’t satisfy Evidential Completeness and so doesn’t
regard P and L(P) as equivalent. Schoenfield’s final step here, then, is to argue that
agents like Aisha do indeed fail to satisfy Evidential Completeness.
This part of the argument begins with the observation that what Evidential
Completeness requires, in Aisha’s case, is that, before undergoing the learning ex-
perience she undergoes between 8 pm on Sunday and 10 am on Monday, she take
L(E∧Dc) to be equivalent to E∧Dc. But L(E∧Dc) is just the proposition that the ev-
idence Aisha gains, on undergoing the learning experience she undergoes between
8 pm on Sunday and 10 am on Monday, is E ∧ Dc, where this latter proposition
is a centered proposition she’d express, at 10 am on Monday, as “E and I’m hy-
poxic now”. Let’s assume—as, again, all parties here are willing to do—that Aisha is
certain that the truth values of evidence propositions are transparent. Because cen-
tered evidence propositions are in play, this assumption, notice, doesn’t entail that
Aisha satisfies Evidential Completeness: for her to satisfy Evidential Completeness
is for her to be certain that, for any evidence proposition she might gain, she’ll gain
it just in case it is true relative to her now, but for her to be certain that the truth
values of evidence propositions are transparent is for her to be certain that, for any
evidence proposition she might gain, she’ll gain it just in case it will be true relative
7The proof appears in Schoenfield (2018: app. 2) and also, with additional commentary, in
Schoenfield (2017: sec. 3).
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to her when she gains it.8 So, given our assumption, what Aisha is certain of, before
undergoing the learning experience, is that L(E∧Dc) is true just in case E andAisha
is hypoxic at 10 am on Monday. That is, at 8 pm on Sunday, she takes L(E ∧Dc) to
be equivalent to E ∧ D, where D is, again, the non–self-locating proposition that
Aisha is hypoxic at 10 am on Monday. (Dc, again, is true relative to a person and
a time, but the source of the problem here is the temporal relativity. Aisha, we can
suppose, remains certain at all times that she is Aisha.)
This tells us two things. First: in order to satisfy Evidential Completeness, Aisha
must takeDc to be equivalent toD. Or, in other words, she must be certain, at 8 pm
on Sunday, that Dc ↔ D, where this is a proposition she’d express as “I’m hypoxic
now just in case Aisha is hypoxic at 10 am on Monday”. But she surely isn’t certain
of that—the fact that she isn’t hypoxic while sitting in her house on Sunday night
just doesn’t have any bearing at all on whether she’ll be hypoxic during her flight
on Monday. So she doesn’t satisfy Evidential Completeness. Second: since Aisha is
certain, at 8 pm on Sunday, that E∧D↔ L(E∧Dc), conditionalizing on L(E∧Dc)
amounts to conditionalizing onE∧D. So it appears that adopting a picture onwhich
higher-order evidence propositions are self-locating can’t help us at all—agents, in
order to maximize expected accuracy, must conditionalize on non–self-locating
analogs of those propositions anyway.
Here’s a more intuitive way of seeing the point here. When Aisha supposes, at 8
pm on Sunday, that L(E∧Dc), what she’s supposing is something that, as she knows,
is true just in case E andAisha is hypoxic at 10 am onMonday. (Again, we’re assum-
ing that she knows that the truth values of evidence propositions are transparent.)
But as we’ve already discussed, even if it’s true that Aisha will be hypoxic at 10 am
on Monday, this fact suggests nothing about her ability to calculate at 8 pm on Sun-
day, when she knows she’s not hypoxic. So pS(H ∣ L(E ∧ Dc)) should be equal to
pS(H ∣ L(E)). And since conditionalization* is the procedure that maximizes ex-
pected accuracy, Aisha, in order to maximize expected accuracy, should remain
steadfast.
Now: there’s a great deal ofmaterial here thatmerits discussion, andwe’ll return
to some of the details in §5 below. For themoment, though, what I want to point out
is this: Schoenfield, in setting up her argument, treats Christensen’s claim that self-
locating belief is important in cases of higher-order defeat as if it’s just equivalent
to the claim that higher-order evidence is itself to be understood as self-locating,
and so she takes her target to be a view on which Aisha ought to conditionalize on
8If it seems odd that what Greaves andWallace’s result requires is that Evidential Completeness
be satisfied rather than that the agent be sure that the truth values of evidence propositions are
transparent, that’s because it is odd. The fact that this is what’s required just follows from the way
the expected accuracy of an update procedure is defined, but as I suggest in §5 below, this definition,
when centered propositions are in play, fails to capture what it’s intended to capture and so stands
in need of revision.
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E∧Dc—i.e., a view on which pM(⋅) should be equal to pS(⋅ ∣ E∧Dc).The reason this
is significant is that there are conclusive reasons for thinking this interpretation
can’t be quite right—the view here can’t really be what Christensen has in mind,
for the simple reason that, even independently of accuracy considerations, it’s very
obviously incompatible with any plausible picture of the dynamics of self-location.
To seewhy, consider that nothing in the setup ofAisha’s case suggests that Aisha
is ever less than sure where she is in time. We can suppose, then, that she perfectly
tracks time, down to the minute: on Monday, at the moment when she updates
on her evidence, she’s certain that it’s now 10 am on Monday. So, since she’s also
(we’re supposing) certain that she’s Aisha, she is, at this moment, certain that she’s
hypoxic now just in case Aisha is hypoxic at 10 am on Monday—i.e., that Dc ↔ D.
But if that’s right, the view Schoenfield takes to be her target fails for trivial reasons:
insofar as Aisha, at the moment when she updates on her evidence, takesDc andD
to be equivalent, there’s no difference, from her perspective, between gaining E∧Dc
and gaining E∧D, whichmeans that insisting on a picture onwhich she gains E∧Dc
rather than E ∧ D is certainly not going to be of any help to us. Something seems
to have gone badly wrong.9
What, exactly, is going on here? Returning to Christensen’s discussion will help
us to diagnose the problem.Theparticular case he’s discussing isn’t Aisha’s case—it’s
a structurally analogous case in which a scientist, on going into the lab on Monday,
gains the evidence E∧D, where E is first-order evidence bearing on a hypothesisH
and D is the higher-order evidence that a reason-distorting drug was slipped into
the scientist’s Monday breakfast. What Christensen says about the case is this:
The way my beliefs should evolve depends crucially on my knowing
my temporal location. If we take D as “I’m drugged Monday at break-
fast,” then D will undermine my confidence in H when I get to the
lab only because I’ll be confident that it’s Monday morning. But on
Sunday, I’m obviously not confident of that. (2010a: 201)
In other words, the scientist, on gaining the higher-order evidence D, should be-
come confident that he’s presently impaired, but the explanation isn’t that D is self-
locating. It’s instead that his background knowledge—in particular, his knowledge
of temporally self-locating information, information about where he is in time—
evolves between Sunday andMonday in such away that the very same higher-order
9Even more strikingly: if Aisha does perfectly track time, then if N is the centered proposition
she’d express by “It’s now Sunday night”, then pS(N) = 1. And if pS(N) = 1, then pS(N ∣ E ∧Dc) = 1,
since conditional credences preserve certainty. So, on the view Schoenfield takes to be her target,
it should be the case that pM(N) = 1: Aisha, at 10 am on Monday, should be certain that it’s now
Sunday night. But this result is obviously absurd. (Incidentally, the view that Aisha should update
by conditionalization* has this same problem, though Schoenfield seems not to have noticed this.
See Darren Bradley (2020) for some additional worries about conditionalization*.)
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information, though it suggests nothing about his present belief state when he con-
siders it on Sunday night, does suggest something about his present belief state
when he considers it on Monday morning.
The thought here, then, seems to be not that higher-order evidence is itself self-
locating but that the evolution of other self-locating beliefs plays an important role
in the phenomenon of higher-order defeat. And if that’s right, Schoenfield’s argu-
ment fails to refute the picture Christensen actually sketches, for the simple reason
that the argument doesn’t target that picture at all. So that picture still stands in
need of evaluation. But before we can evaluate it, we need to understand a bit more
about the dynamics of the relevant self-locating beliefs.
3 The dynamics of self-location
As we saw in considering Aisha’s case, higher-order defeat doesn’t require that
agents be susceptible to losing track of time, nor does it require that they be suscep-
tible to becoming less than certain about who they are. So, for our purposes, there’s
no need to discuss in any detail how to model agents who have these susceptibili-
ties. (Indeed, modeling such agents is going to present its own problems, problems
that have nothing to do with higher-order evidence, and we would do well to dis-
entangle these problems from the question of how to model cases of higher-order
defeat.) Our focus here, then, will be on agents who (a) never lose track of time
and (b) always remain certain of who they are. We’ll also assume, for simplicity,
that the agents in question (c) have some canonical way of referring to locations
in time. Call agents who meet these criteria self-certain. The rest of our discussion
will proceed under the simplifying assumption that Aisha is a self-certain agent.
Our question, then, is how to model the evolution of the beliefs of self-certain
agents over time. Up to now we’ve been assuming, as is usual in the recent epis-
temological literature, that, in general, self-locating beliefs are to be understood
as attitudes toward centered propositions. And on this way of understanding self-
locating beliefs, it’s trivially easy to model a self-certain agent’s continued certainty
about her own identity. Aisha’s certainty that she’s Aisha, for instance, can be mod-
eled as amaximal credence,maintained over time, in the centered proposition she’d
express by “I am Aisha”, where this proposition is true at any centered world such
that the agent on which that world is centered is Aisha.
Modeling an agent’s temporally self-locating knowledge, though, is muchmore
difficult. The problem is that the objects of temporally self-locating belief are, on
this framework, centered propositions that change in truth value over time, which
means that tomaintain the same attitudes toward these propositions as time passes
is to fail to keep track of time—successful timekeeping requires that agents engage
in continuous revision of awide variety of their beliefs. If, for instance, a self-certain
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agent is at one moment certain that she’s at time t, this certainty can be modeled as
a maximal credence in the centered proposition she’d express by “It’s now time t”,
where this proposition is true at any centered world such that the time on which
that world is centered is t. But if some amount of time n passes, she’ll no longer
be have a maximal credence in that proposition. She’ll instead have a maximal cre-
dence in a different centered proposition, one she’d express as “Time t was n ago”
(or, alternatively, as “It’s now time t + n”), where this proposition is true at any
centered world such that the time on which that world is centered is t + n. And
similarly for her other temporally self-locating beliefs. Suppose, for instance, that
at t she has a particular credence in the centered proposition she’d express by “The
cat is on the mat now”—i.e., in the proposition that’s true at any centered world
such that, at the time on which that world is centered, the cat is on the mat—and
suppose that, between t and t + n, she doesn’t gain any new evidence relevant to
whether the cat was on the mat at t. Then she should, at t + n, have that same cre-
dence in the different centered proposition she’d express by “The cat was on the
mat n ago”, where this proposition is true at any centered world such that, n before
the time on which that world is centered, the cat was on the mat.
More generally, if an agent has a temporally self-locating attitude at time t, its
object, on this framework, is a centered proposition P. But the associated attitude
at t + n (where n may be positive or negative) is not her attitude toward P—it’s an
attitude toward a related centered proposition Pn, where Pn is true at a centered
world ⟨w,a, t+n⟩ just in case P is true at ⟨w,a, t⟩. We’ll call this related proposition
the n-shifted counterpart of P. (Note that, for any attitude that’s not temporally self-
locating, the proposition that is its object will be such that the time on which a
world is centered makes no difference to the proposition’s truth value. So, for any
such proposition, P = Pn.)
The framework here, in short, is one onwhich failure to keep track of time is the
default condition—an agent who can successfully keep track of time is thereby an
agent a wide variety of whose beliefs are in a constant state of flux. As a result, the
dynamics of temporal self-location are apt to seem mysterious, especially if we’re
sympathetic to the evidentialist assumption that rational agents revise their beliefs
only in response to new evidence: on that assumption, a rational agent, in order to
keep track of time, must be responsive not only to the usual perceptual evidence
about what the world is like but also to an additional continuous stream of tem-
poral evidence that needs to be processed, not by conditionalization as standardly
formulated, but in some different way. (Again, conditional credences, as standardly
understood, preserve certainty, but we’ve seen that keeping track of time involves
losing certainty in, for instance, the proposition an agent would express by “It’s now
time t”.)
This difficulty aside, though, it’s clear enough that the continuous revision re-
quired here is highly systematic—even on a framework that emphasizes flux, we
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can see that keeping track of time involves a kind of stability as well. And as it
turns out, there’s a way of modeling self-location that brings this stability to the
fore: rather than understanding self-locating beliefs as attitudes toward centered
propositions, we might understand them as attitudes toward Fregean thoughts. In
particular, wemight understand temporally self-locating beliefs as attitudes toward
dynamic Fregean thoughts of the sort described by Gareth Evans (1981): thoughts
an agent’s grasp of which depends on her ability to keep track of time.
In general, a Fregean thought is composed of the senses of the words one would
use to express that thought, where the sense of an expression (in a context) is a par-
ticularmode of presentation, or way of thinking, of that to which the expression (in
that context) refers. And if self-locating beliefs are understood as attitudes toward
thoughts of this sort, modeling an agent’s certainty about her own identity is, as
before, trivially easy. When an agent grasps a first-personal thought, she is think-
ing of herself in a particular way: from the inside, so to speak.10 So we can model
Aisha’s certainty that she’s Aisha, for instance, as a maximal credence, maintained
over time, in the first-personal Fregean thought she’d express by “I am Aisha”.
As for temporally self-locating knowledge: note first that the dynamic thoughts
described by Evans are thoughts about a particular moment of time such that the
agent’s way of thinking about the moment, the mode in which it’s presented to her,
is a product of her ability to keep track of time. The idea is that, when the agent
thinks of somemoment as now and then oneminute later thinks of it as one minute
ago, she’s thinking of that moment in the sameway—roughly, the keeping-track-of-
time way—both times. The framework here, as Evans explains, is one on which
being in the same epistemic state may require different things of us
at different times; the changing circumstances force us to change in
order to keep hold of a constant reference and a constant thought—we
must run to keep still. From this point of view, the acceptance on d2
of ‘Yesterday was fine’, given an acceptance on d1 of ‘Today is fine’, can
manifest the persistence of a belief in just the way in which acceptance
of different utterances of the same sentence ‘The sun sets in the West’
can. (1981: 293)
That is, when an agent on one day has a belief that she’d express by “Today is fine”
and then, by virtue of successfully keeping track of time, has a belief on the next day
that she’d express by “Yesterday was fine”, we can understand her as being related
in slightly different ways to the very same Fregean thought, and so, insofar as her
credence in that thought doesn’t change between the first day and the second, we
can understand her as having a single belief that persists over time rather than as
10As Frege puts it: “Everyone is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which
he is presented to no-one else” (1918/1956: 298).
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having a succession of beliefs that are systematically related despite having different
objects.11
On this alternative framework, successful timekeeping is primarily a matter of
belief maintenance rather than of belief revision—since dynamic Fregean thoughts
don’t change in truth value over time, agents’ beliefs aren’t required to be in a con-
stant state of flux. So the dynamics here turn out to be relatively simple. For in-
stance, since the agent in the above case of the cat and the mat is successfully keep-
ing track of time, the dynamic Fregean thought expressed at t by “The cat is on the
mat now” is the very same thought as that expressed at t+n by “The cat was on the
mat n ago”, and so, unless the agent gains information that’s relevant to whether the
cat was on the mat at t, her credence in this thought shouldn’t change at all—she
should simply maintain her belief.
This, then, is a framework on which keeping track of time is the default condi-
tion—there’s no need to suppose that successful timekeeping involves continuous
updating of a wide variety of beliefs in response to a stream ofmysterious temporal
evidence.We can suppose instead that no special story of what successful timekeep-
ing involves is required at all; if there’s anything mysterious or difficult to model
about temporal self-location, it’s the phenomenon of losing track of time, not the
phenomenon of keeping track of time.12
Of course, strictly speaking, a self-certain agent’s credences in Fregean thoughts
can’t on their ownmodel her belief state at a given time—her certainty about where
she is in time isn’t representable as an attitude toward a dynamic Fregean thought.
The problem is that the dynamic thought that she’d express at t by “It’s now time t”
is the very same thought that she’d express at t+n by “Time twas n ago” and at t−n
by “Time t will be in n”; this thought doesn’t change in truth value as time passes.
So her credence in this thought should remain the same over time, which means
this credence can’t be used to represent her knowledge of her temporal location
as that location changes. In order to fully represent her belief state, then, we must
include, in addition to her credences in Fregean thoughts, some representation of
her knowledge of what moment is the present moment. Let us, then, model her
belief state, not just as a probability function, but as an ordered pair ⟨p, t⟩, where p
is a probability function and t denotes the time she knows to be the present time.
Something similar goes for modeling suppositional beliefs. An agent can, after
11Note that that the view here is distinct from that defended by Perry (1979) and Kaplan (1989),
onwhich to have a self-locating belief is to be related in a particular way to a de re proposition. Being
related in different ways at different times to the same de re proposition need not be a manifestation
of an ability to keep track of time.
12Incidentally, we won’t be discussing in detail this framework’s treatment of cases in which an
agent loses track of time—again, modeling these cases isn’t going to be important for our purposes
here. But, very briefly: losing track of time, on this framework, is to be understood as a kind of
forgetting.
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all, engage in suppositional reasoning not only about evidence shemight gain about
the world but also about the passage of time—she can, so to speak, suppositionally
project herself into the future—and so we need to be able to model the beliefs she
has conditional on the supposition that some amount of time has passed. On the
usual centered-proposition framework, we plausibly can model these beliefs as be-
liefs conditional on the supposition that the only new evidence she’s gained is a
stream of temporal evidence, where this amounts to taking any belief she has at
time t on supposing that n has passed to be a belief conditional on the supposition
that, for every centered proposition in her total body of evidence at t, its n-shifted
counterpart is true instead. (Admittedly, these suppositional beliefs can’t be mod-
eled as conditional probabilities of the usual sort, since the agent is supposing true
something she’s certain is false. The point, for now, is just that there’s going to be
some way to represent an agent’s projection of herself into the future in terms of
her attitudes toward centered propositions.) But there’s no analogous way tomodel
these beliefs as beliefs conditional on the supposition that some Fregean thought
is true, since, again, dynamic Fregean thoughts don’t change in truth value as time
passes. Some other way of representing agents’ projection of themselves into the fu-
ture is needed. Let us, then, redefine our probability function so that it isn’t a binary
function that returns a probability given some proposition P and some (possibly
empty) evidence proposition E but is instead a ternary function p(P ∣ E,n), where
n is a time adjustment factor representing how far in the future the agent is suppos-
ing herself to be. (We can then understand ‘p(P)’ and ’p(P ∣ E)’ as abbreviations of
‘p(P ∣ ⊺, 0)’ and ‘p(P ∣ E, 0)’, respectively.)
Moving on: I don’t mean to suggest, in introducing this Fregean framework,
that it’s correct and the centered-proposition framework incorrect, nor do I mean
to suggest that the Fregean framework is better suited for every purpose than the
centered-proposition framework is. The point is just that a second way of model-
ing the self-locating beliefs of self-certain agents is indeed available—these agents’
temporally self-locating beliefs exhibit a kind of stability that isn’t entirely obvious
on the centered-proposition framework, and the Fregean framework allows us to
make this stability explicit, if we’re interested in doing so. The reason this is signif-
icant for our purposes is that making this stability explicit allows us to parse out
changes in belief that occur in response to the passage of time from those that occur
in response to new evidence about the world, and treating these changes separately
makes it relatively easy to see that there are certain restrictions on what results a
reasonable belief update procedure may deliver in cases of self-certainty.
Note that, if an agent is self-certain, her self-locating beliefs, if we model them
as attitudes toward Fregean thoughts, are, from the agent’s own perspective, equiv-
alent to beliefs in standard non–self-locating propositions. If the agent is certain
that she’s Sheila and that it’s 3 pm on October 1, 1989, for instance, then the con-
tent of the belief she’d express as “I’m hungry now”, if we model that content as a
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dynamic Fregean thought, is equivalent, from the agent’s perspective, to the non–
self-locating proposition that Sheila is hungry at 3 pm onOctober 1, 1989—she can
be certain, no matter how much time has passed, that the belief in question is true
if and only if Sheila was hungry at 3 pm on October 1, 1989. And the same goes
for any evidence she might gain—even if the evidence is temporally self-locating,
we can model it as a dynamic Fregean thought, in which case it’s going to be equiv-
alent, from the agent’s own perspective, to a standard non–self-locating evidence
proposition.
In short, since cases of self-certainty are cases in which the agent is always sure
who she is andwhere she is in time, they’re cases inwhich the Fregean framework al-
lows us, in considering how she should update on new evidence, to set self-locating
information aside completely: any new evidence she gains is going to be best un-
derstood as new evidence about what the world is like, and updating on that new
evidence is going to be best understood as updating her beliefs about what the
world is like. And we know already that the right way to update one’s beliefs about
what the world is like in the face of new information about what the world is like—
i.e., the right way to update when self-locating information is not in play—is by
conditionalization. So, if we model the objects of belief as Fregean thoughts, we
can conclude that, if the agent, on undergoing a learning experience between t and
t + n, gains evidence modeled by the Fregean thought EF and then updates on that
evidence at t + n, then it should be the case that pt+n(⋅) = p(t+n)−(⋅ ∣ EF, 0), where
⟨p(t+n)−, t+ n⟩models her state just before she updates and ⟨pt+n, t+ n⟩models her
state just after.13
Of course, what we’re really interested in is how her state just after she updates
on EF should relate to her state at t. So there remains the question of how her atti-
tudes should evolve between t and t + n, before she updates on EF—i.e., of how her
state at t should relate to the state she’s in just before she updates. And this isn’t a
trivial question to answer, especially since we haven’t yet said much of substance
about what, in general, it takes to respond rationally to the passage of time. But
consider: given how we’ve characterized suppositional projection of oneself into
the future, there aren’t any formal constraints on what the relationship should be
between an agent’s unconditional credences and her credences conditional on this
sort of projection. So we can simply stipulate that our agent is disposed to respond
rationally to the passage of time, whatever responding rationally to the passage of
time amounts to, and that these dispositions are encoded into her future-projected
credences. And if we do so, our answer here becomes very simple: the attitudes
our agent has just before she updates should be the same as the attitudes she has
at t conditional on the supposition that n has passed. Or, more formally, it should
be the case that p(t+n)−(⋅ ∣ EF, 0) = pt(⋅ ∣ EF,n), where ⟨pt, t⟩ models her state at
13We’re assuming for simplicity that, in ideal cases, updating one’s beliefs doesn’t take any time.
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t.14 And that means it should be the case that pt+n(⋅) = pt(⋅ ∣ EF,n). That is, the
attitudes toward Fregean thoughts she has just after updating should match the
future-projected conditional-on-EF attitudes she has at t.
Once we’ve used the Fregean framework to arrive at this result, it’s relatively
straightforward to translate it back into the more familiar language of the centered-
proposition framework. Suppose again that our self-certain agent is in the situation
described above: she gains some evidence between t and t+n and then updates on
that evidence at t + n. Then the question is how the agent’s attitude toward a given
proposition P at t + n, just after she updates on an evidence proposition E, should
be related to her attitudes at t, where all of her attitudes are understood as attitudes
toward centered propositions.
Thekey thing to keep inmindhere is that, thoughwe’reworking in the centered-
proposition framework, we already know how to model all of the agent’s attitudes
according to the Fregean framework as well. So, in particular, the credence she has
in P just after updating can equally well be expressed as a credence in a Fregean
thought PF. And that means it should be the case that pt+n(P) = pt+n(PF). Further-
more, we’ve already seen that pt+n(PF) should be equal to pt(PF ∣ EF,n), where EF is
a Fregean thought representing the evidence on which she updates. But again, the
attitude expressed by pt(PF ∣ EF,n), though it’s expressed here as a future-projected
credence in a Fregean thought conditional on another Fregean thought, can equally
well be understood as a credence in the centered proposition P conditional on sup-
posing that the centered proposition E is true and that n has passed, where, again,
supposing that n has passed can be understood as supposing, for every proposi-
tion in one’s total body of evidence, that its n-shifted counterpart is true instead.
To model this sort of suppositional belief, we need to generalize our notion of con-
ditional probability so that it allows for suppositional subtraction of propositions
from the set that makes up an agent’s total evidence as well as for suppositional ad-
dition of propositions to that set.15 So let us stipulate that pt(⋅ ∣ +Γ,−Δ) represents
14It’s superficially plausible that, since the truth values of Fregean thoughts don’t change over
time, projecting oneself into the future should make no difference to one’s attitudes toward those
thoughts, in which case pt(⋅ ∣ EF,n) should be equal to pt(⋅ ∣ EF, 0). But this is a version of what
Titelbaum (2008) calls the Relevance-Limiting Thesis—roughly, that if the only new information
one gains is self-locating information (i.e., if one’s new information doesn’t rule out any non–self-
locating possibilities), then it can never be rational to change beliefs the contents of which aren’t
self-locating—and that thesis is controversial. Titelbaum, for instance, argues that it’s false, though
he accepts a restricted version of it that applies in cases in which the agent is self-certain (see his
2013: chap. 10 and his 2016). In §§6–7 we’ll see that the phenomenon of higher-order defeat gives
us some reason to think that even this restricted version is false.
15Note that, following, e.g., Huw Price (1986), AlanHájek (2003), and Titelbaum (forthcoming),
I am here taking conditional credence (both in its usual form and in this generalized form) to be
mathematically primitive: conditional credences aren’t defined in terms of unconditional credences
but instead directly model agents’ suppositional degrees of belief. So there is no mathematical defi-
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the agent’s state conditional on suppositionally adding the propositions in Γ to and
subtracting the propositions in Δ from her total evidence.16 Then we can model
our agent’s suppositional credence in P as follows: pt(P ∣ +{E} ∪ Cn,−C), where C
is the agent’s total evidence at t and Cn is the set that results from replacing every
proposition in C with its n-shifted counterpart. A few substitutions, then, give us
the following:
Self-Certainty Constraint. In cases inwhich a self-certain agent’s dispositions
to respond rationally to the passage of time are encoded in her future-projected
credences, if she gains some evidence between t and t + n that can be modeled at
t+n by E, then, for any P, it should be the case that pt+n(P) = pt(P ∣ +{E}∪Cn,−C).
That is, her attitudes toward centered propositions at t + n, just after updating,
should match the conditional-on-E-and-n-having-passed attitudes she has toward
those propositions at t.17
The lesson here, then, can be stated as follows: any generalized Bayesian ap-
proach to belief update, if it’s to provide a reasonable treatment of the dynamics of
nition to be given of this generalized notion of conditional credence.
16Titelbaum (2013) introduces a formal framework that allows for the modeling of certainty
loss over time, but he opts not to countenance beliefs conditional on certainly false suppositions,
on the grounds that adding such a supposition to one’s total evidence results in “a situation partially
defined by the truth of a logical contradiction” (2013: 103). Generalizing the notion of conditional
probability so as to allow for suppositional subtraction gives us a formal way around this problem,
but there remains the question of whether there’s good psychological sense to be made of an agent’s
having beliefs conditional on the removal of propositions from her evidence set. We don’t need to
take any stand here about whether there’s sense to be made of this sort of suppositional subtraction
in general, but I take it that it’s clear enough that the particular cases under discussion here—cases
in which an agent replaces the propositions in her evidence set with shifted counterparts so as
to suppositionally project herself into the future—make good psychological sense. See also David
Chalmers’s (2011: 631–632) defense of the view that, in cases in which a certainly false centered
propositionmay become true in the future, an agent can have (and can conditionalize on) credences
conditional on that centered proposition.
17If we translate the version of the Relevance-Limiting Thesis mentioned in fn. 14 into the
centered-proposition framework, what we get is the thesis that pt(P ∣ +{E} ∪ Cn,−C) should be
equal to pt(P−n ∣ E−n), that the agent’s attitudes toward centered propositions on supposing n has
passed should match her present attitudes toward the minus-n-shifted counterparts of those propo-
sitions. If this thesis were correct, we could conclude that pt+n(P) should be equal to pt(P−n ∣ E−n)—
i.e., that self-certain agents should conform to a version of the update procedure Moritz Schulz
(2010) calls continuous conditionalization and Wolfgang Schwarz (2012, 2015, 2017) calls (SC), or
shifted conditioning. (Both Schulz and Schwarz endorse this procedure as a rational requirement in
cases of agents that don’t lose track of time. Note also that quite a few of the generalizations of con-
ditionalization that have been proposed for handling temporal self-location—e.g., those proposed
by Namjoong Kim (2009), Ray Briggs (2010), Christopher Meacham (2010), Sarah Moss (2012),
and Wolfgang Spohn (2017)—reduce to this procedure in cases of self-certainty.) But again, there’s
reason to think the Relevance-Limiting Thesis is false. I explain in §6 why setting pt+n(P) equal to
pt(P−n ∣ E−n) isn’t the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy.
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self-location, must deliver the verdicts mandated by the Self-Certainty Constraint.
With this lesson in hand, we’re ready to return to the question of whether calibra-
tionism is incompatible with Bayesianism.
4 Calibrationism and Bayesianism
Let us, then, reexamineAisha’s case, keeping inmind now that we’re working under
the simplifying assumption that Aisha is a self-certain agent. To recap: pS models
Aisha’s state at 8 pm on Sunday; pM models her state at 10 am on Monday; H is the
proposition that, on Monday, she has enough fuel to reach the farther airstrip; D
is the higher-order evidence that she’s hypoxic at 10 am on Monday; and E is the
rest of the evidence she gains between 8 pm on Sunday and 10 am on Monday. (As
we’ve seen, in cases inwhich an agent is always certainwho she is andwhere she is in
time, it makes no difference from the agent’s perspective whether the propositions
under discussion are self-locating propositions or their non–self-locating analogs.
So, since Aisha is self-certain, we can assume without loss of generality that H, E,
and D aren’t self-locating.)
On the assumption that Aisha is disposed to respond rationally to the passage
of time and that these dispositions are encoded in her future-projected credences,
the Self-Certainty Constraint entails that pM(H) should be equal to pS(H ∣ +{E ∧
D}∪C14∶00∶00S ,−CS), whereCS is Aisha’s total evidence at 8 pm on Sunday.That is, the
constraint entails that Aisha’s unconditional credence at 10 am on Monday in the
proposition that she has enough fuel to reach the farther airstrip should match the
credence she has in that proposition at 8 pm on Sunday conditional on supposing
that she has gained E ∧D and that fourteen hours have passed. So any reasonable
Bayesian approach to belief update that’s general enough to to handle self-locating
beliefs will deliver this verdict.
This tells us that a reasonable generalized Bayesian approach is not incompat-
ible with the thesis that she should calibrate in the face of D: as long as pS(H ∣
+{E ∧D} ∪C14∶00∶00S ,−CS) should be less than pS(H ∣ +{E} ∪C14∶00∶00S ,−CS)—i.e., as
long as, at 8 pm on Sunday, Aisha should take the proposition that she’s hypoxic
at 10 am on Monday to be relevant, on the supposition that fourteen hours have
passed, to how likely it is that the calculations she’s performing are correct—any
reasonable conditionalization principle will deliver the verdict that she should in-
deed calibrate. But given Aisha’s self-certainty, she can be certain, on supposing
that fourteen hours have passed, that it’s now 10 am on Monday, in which case D
entails that she’s hypoxic now. And the proposition that she’s hypoxic now entails
in turn that the calculations she’s performing now are hypoxia-affected. So, inso-
far as it’s plausible that the information that her calculations are hypoxia-affected
is relevant to how confident she should be in those calculations, it’s plausible that
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pS(H ∣ +{E ∧ D} ∪ C14∶00∶00S ,−CS) should be less than pS(H ∣ +{E} ∪ C14∶00∶00S ,−CS).
And it’s exceedingly plausible that this information is relevant—indeed, the plausi-
bility of this judgment was what led us to calibrationism in the first place.
It appears, then, that, by generalizing of the notion of conditional probability
so as to allow for the modeling of agents’ ability to suppositionally project them-
selves into the future, we’ve made it quite simple to show that, plausibly, any rea-
sonable Bayesian approach to belief update is compatible with calibrationism. But
we should be cautious: despite the plausibility of the claim that pS(H ∣ +{E ∧D} ∪
C14∶00∶00S ,−CS) should be less than pS(H ∣ +{E} ∪ C14∶00∶00S ,−CS), there remains the
question of whether, if pS(H ∣ +{E∧D}∪C14∶00∶00S ,−CS)meets this constraint,match-
ing pM(H) to this suppositional attitude is the procedure that maximizes Aisha’s
expected accuracy. This is the question to which we now turn.
5 Calculating expected accuracy
If we’re to answer this question, we must first ensure that we have a complete un-
derstanding of how the expected accuracy of an update procedure of this sort is
to be calculated. Let’s first consider the standard approach, the one relied on by
Greaves and Wallace, on which the expected accuracy, from the point of view of
a prior credence function p, of a procedure U for updating one’s beliefs on under-
going a particular learning experience—in particular, an experience in which the
agent knows she’ll gain exactly one new evidence proposition from a specified set






where A(w,U(Xi)) is the accuracy score, in world w, of the credence function that
is the outcome of updating on new evidenceXi via procedureU.The idea is that, for
each world that isn’t entirely ruled out by the prior credence function, there’s one
evidence proposition that’s the proposition the agent will gain if that world is actual,
and so we can understand the accuracy score ofU, in a given world, as the accuracy
score, in that world, of the probability function that is the outcome of updating on
the evidence proposition gained in that world. So, in order to calculate the expected
accuracy of U, we need only weight each of these accuracy scores using the prior
credence that the world in question is actual and then sum these weighted scores.
This formula is sensible if the propositions over which the relevant credence
functions are defined are understood as sets of possible worlds. But the credence
functions we’re interested in are defined instead over centered propositions, sets of
centered worlds. And when centered propositions are in play, this formula leads
quickly to absurdity.
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The problem arises from the fact that learning experiences take time, and so,
in general, the evidence an agent gains on undergoing some learning experience
is going to include evidence that time has passed.18 Suppose, for instance, that the
agent is self-certain and that the learning experience under consideration is the
experience she’s going to undergo over some specified amount of time n. Then the
evidence she gains is going to include evidence that n has passed. So, if t is the
time just before she undergoes the experience and pt is her credence function at
t—i.e., her prior credence function—then for any Xi ∈ Γ, Xi is going to include
evidence that the time is now t + n rather than t, in which case any centered world
in Xi is going to be a world centered on t + n. But that means that, for any w ∈ Xi,
pt({w}) = 0, since the agent is certain at t that the current time is not t + n. And if
that’s right, then, absurdly, EApt(U) = 0, for any U—the expected accuracy of any
update procedure is 0.
The explanation for this absurd result is that pt({w}) just isn’t the right prior
credence by which to weight the accuracy score A(w,U(Xi)): that score, after all,
is the accuracy score, inw, of the credence functionU(Xi), and that credence func-
tion is the credence function the agent will have at the end of the learning experi-
ence—in this case, at t+n—if she updates onXi viaU. So what determines how this
accuracy score contributes to the expected accuracy of U is the probability, from
the agent’s perspective at t, thatwwill be actual at t+n, not the probability thatw is
actual at t. Or, more generally: in order to calculate the expected accuracy ofU, we
should weight A(w,U(Xi)) using the agent’s prior credence that wwill be actual at
the end of the learning experience, not her prior credence that w is actual now.
This, incidentally, is enough to show that Schoenfield’s argument that condi-
tionalization maximizes expected accuracy only on the assumption of Evidential
Completeness goes wrong in cases in which centered propositions are in play. As
is clear from her discussion (see her 2018: app. 1), what matters for whether con-
ditionalization maximizes expected accuracy, when centered propositions are not










where L(Xi) is the proposition that the evidence the agent gains, on undergoing the
learning experience, is Xi, and where L(Γ) is the set of all such propositions. (The
reason this equivalence is whatmatters, according to Schoenfield, is that, in general,
the expected accuracy of U is given by the quantity on the left, not the one on the
18Strictly speaking, there will be temporal evidence propositions lost as well as temporal evi-
dence propositions gained, for reasons discussed above. But there’s no need here to explicitly repre-
sent the loss of the old propositions—that loss is implicit in the gaining of the new ones, since the
new ones just entail that the old ones are false.
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right.) And this equivalence is guaranteed to hold when Evidential Completeness
is satisfied—i.e., when the agent is certain, before undergoing the learning experi-
ence, that Xi ↔ L(Xi), for any Xi ∈ Γ. But when centered propositions are in play,
expected accuracy is calculated by appeal not to p({w}) but to the agent’s prior
credence that w will be actual after the agent undergoes the learning experience,
which means that what matters is not whether the equivalence above holds but
whether, if p({w}) were replaced on both sides by this prior credence, the result-
ing equivalence would hold. And that equivalence is guaranteed to hold, not when
Evidential Completeness is satisfied, but when the agent is certain, for any Xi ∈ Γ,
that Xi ↔ L(Xi) will be true at the end of the learning experience. Schoenfield’s
argument, then, gives us no reason to doubt that, when centered propositions are
in play, conditionalization is the procedure that maximizes expected accuracy.
Moving on: in order to determine how expected accuracy is in fact to be calcu-
lated when centered propositions are in play, we need to determine how to repre-
sent the agent’s prior credence that a given world w will be actual at the end of the
learning experience. And in the case of a self-certain agent who knows how long
the learning experience will take, representing this credence is simple: if such an
agent is considering, at t, the learning experience she’s going to undergo between
t and t + n, her prior credence that w will be actual at the end of the learning ex-
perience is just given by pt({w}−n)—i.e., her credence, at t, in the minus-n-shifted
counterpart of {w} (or, in other words, in the proposition that the centered world
that’s actual now is the world that’s identical tow except that its temporal center has
been moved backward by n). The expected accuracy of a given update procedure






This, then, is the correct formula for calculating the expected accuracy of an update
procedure when centered propositions are in play, at least in cases in which a self-
certain agent knows in advance how long her learning experience will take.
6 Maximizing expected accuracy
Here we have a bit of a problem. Consider that, given this formula, we can demon-
strate, by adapting the reasoning in Greaves andWallace’s proof, that the procedure
that maximizes EApt(U) is that U such that, for any Xi ∈ Γ, U(Xi) is the credence
function pt+n such that
pt+n(P) = pt(P−n ∣ X−ni )
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for any proposition P.19 Applied to Aisha’s case, this tells us that, if she, at 8 pm on
Sunday, is considering the learning experience she’s going to undergo between 8
pm on Sunday and 10 am on Monday, the procedure that maximizes EApS(U) is
that U such that, for any Xi ∈ Γ, U(Xi) is the credence function pM such that
pM(P) = pS(P−14∶00∶00 ∣ X−14∶00∶00i )
for any proposition P. (We’ll call this procedure shifted conditionalization.) But if
that’s right, then, insofar as Aisha should maximize EApS(U), the claim that she
should update in the way required by the Self-Certainty Constraint entails that she
should set her conditional-on-fourteen-hours-having-passed credences in such a
way that, for any Xi ∈ Γ,
pS(P ∣ +{Xi},−CS) = pS(P−14∶00∶00 ∣ X−14∶00∶00i )
for any P. And from this it follows that, insofar as Aisha should maximize EApS(U),
our conclusion in §4 was incorrect. That is, it follows that pS(H ∣ +{E ∧ D} ∪
C14∶00∶00S ,−CS), insofar as Aisha should indeed set pM(H) equal to that suppositional
credence, should not be less than pS(H ∣ +{E} ∪ C14∶00∶00S ,−CS), in which case the
thesis that she should update in the way required by Self-Certainty Constraint is
incompatible with the thesis that she should calibrate.
To see why, consider that the evidence proposition Xi that Aisha gains, on un-
dergoing her learning experience, can be thought of as a conjunction whose con-
juncts are ⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩ (where this is itself a conjunction whose conjuncts are the
members of C14∶00∶00S ) along with whatever other evidence propositions she gains.
But in that case, it turns out that, when Xi is shifted backward by fourteen hours,
the members of C14∶00∶00S just turn into the members of CS, which are already in her
total evidence. Furthermore, if the other evidence propositions she gains are not
self-locating, shiftingXi backward by fourteen hours isn’t going to change those ev-
idence propositions at all. So, since E andD are (we’re supposing) not self-locating,
it turns out that, from Aisha’s perspective at 8 pm on Sunday, supposing X−14∶00∶00i
just amounts to supposing E ∧D if Xi = E ∧D ∧ ⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩, and supposing X−14∶00∶00i
just amounts to supposing E if Xi = E ∧ ⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩. Finally, since H is also (we’re
supposing) not self-locating, shifting it backward by fourteen hours doesn’t have
any effect either: H = H−14∶00∶00. The following, then, are instances of the above
19Although the required adaptation of Greaves and Wallace’s reasoning is straightforward, trac-
ing that reasoning in detail would require introducing conceptual resources that are beyond the
scope of our discussion. But note that Schwarz (2015: sec. 6) argues, by adapting a proof given by
Hannes Leitgeb and Richard Pettigrew (2010) that’s similar but not identical to the one given by
Greaves and Wallace, that the above procedure does maximize expected accuracy. (Recall that, as
mentioned in fn. 17, this is the procedure Schwarz calls shifted conditioning.)
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equivalence:
pS(H ∣ +{E ∧D} ∪ C14∶00∶00S ,−CS) = pS(H ∣ E ∧D)
pS(H ∣ +{E} ∪ C14∶00∶00S ,−CS) = pS(H ∣ E)
But pS(H ∣ E ∧ D) should be equal to pS(H ∣ E), for reasons we’ve already dis-
cussed: the supposition that Aisha will be hypoxic at 10 am on Monday should
make no difference to her confidence in her (non–future-projected) calculations
on Sunday, when she knows she’s not hypoxic. It follows, then, that pS(H ∣ +{E ∧
D} ∪ C14∶00∶00S ,−CS) = pS(H ∣ +{E} ∪ C14∶00∶00S ,−CS), in which case updating in the
way required by the Self-Certainty Constraint involves remaining steadfast, not cal-
ibrating.
If we’re to show that calibrating is the procedure that maximizes expected ac-
curacy, we need to explain why this result, despite appearances, doesn’t just imme-
diately entail that Aisha, in order to maximize expected accuracy, should remain
steadfast in the face of D. And we can indeed explain this, though doing so will
require examining one of the assumptions underlying Greaves and Wallace’s way
of characterizing update procedures.
Note that, although Greaves and Wallace characterize the update procedures
over which expected accuracy is defined as functions from evidence propositions
to credal states, they acknowledge that a more general characterization is available:
we might instead take an update procedure to be a function from world states—in
our case, centered worlds—to credal states, so that for an agent to conform to a
given procedure U is just for her to enter into the credal state U(w) if w is actual.
Their result, though, requires that they adopt the more restricted characterization:
on the more general characterization, the procedure that maximizes expected ac-
curacy is not conditionalization but the truth rule, the function that, for any w,
returns a credence function p such that p(P) = 1 if P is true in w and p(P) = 0
otherwise. The justification they offer for adopting the more restricted characteri-
zation is that, if a functionU fromworld states to credal states isn’t representable as
a function fromevidence propositions—i.e., if, for somew1 andw2,U(w1) ≠ U(w2)
despite the agent gaining the same evidence in both worlds—then that U isn’t an
available update procedure, since conforming to it “would require the agent to re-
spond to information that he does not have” (2006: 612); this is why the truth rule,
for instance, doesn’t count as available. Their argument, then, is to be understood
as an argument that conditionalization is the available procedure that maximizes
expected accuracy.
The thought here seems to be that no agent, not even an ideal one, can expect
herself to conform to a procedure that requires her to have different beliefs in w1
than she does inw2 despite the fact that she gains exactly the same evidence in both
worlds, and if a procedure is such that not even an ideal agent can expect herself
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to conform to it, it isn’t a procedure that’s available for use in any genuine sense.20
But if this is right, then there’s a gap in Greaves and Wallace’s argument: they sim-
ply assume that any procedure that is representable as a function from evidence
propositions to credal states is available, and it’s not obvious that this assumption
is true. Indeed, unless it’s somehow the case that every ideal agent is certain a priori
of her own immunity to hypoxia, reason-distorting drugs, and all other sources of
cognitive impairment, the assumption is not true—insofar as the agent takes it to
be possible that she’s vulnerable to some cognitive impairment or other, there are
going to be procedures to which she can’t expect herself to conform despite the
fact that they’re representable as functions from evidence propositions to credal
states.21
Aisha herself is a case in point. Even if she’s in fact ideal, she can’t, unless she’s
certain a priori that she’s immune to hypoxia, expect, at 8 pm on Sunday, that she’ll
conform to an update procedure requiring that, on gaining E ∧D ∧ ⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩, she
set her credence in H equal to pS(H ∣ E ∧D). After all, on Sunday, she expects, on
supposing E ∧D, that she’ll be hypoxic at 10 am on Monday and so will be unable
to reliably complete the calculations underlying her current conditional credence
pS(H ∣ E∧D). Moreover, she expects that, at 10 am on Monday, she won’t have any
direct access to this earlier conditional credence, since, by stipulation, either she
doesn’t explicitly do any calculations on Sunday or, if she does, hypoxia distorts
one’s memories in such a way that her later memories of those calculations aren’t
to be trusted. So there just is nomechanism bywhich she can formnew beliefs such
that she can expect that pM(H) will be equal to pS(H ∣ E ∧ D). And if that’s right,
then any update procedure, if it requires these credences to be equal, is thereby not
an available procedure.
It turns out, then, that shifted conditionalization isn’t available. And if it’s not an
available procedure at all, it certainly isn’t the available procedure that maximizes
expected accuracy. This is what allows us to avoid the conclusion that Aisha, in
order to maximize expected accuracy, should remain steadfast in the face of D.
Is there an available update procedure such that, if Aisha conforms to it, she’ll
remain steadfast? Yes: the update procedure to which she’ll conform simply by do-
ing her calculations on Monday and setting her credence in H based on the re-
sult of those calculations, without taking D into account at all. But this procedure
doesn’t maximize expected accuracy: we can demonstrate that, if Aisha, on gain-
ing E ∧ D ∧ ⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩, sets her credence in H via this steadfasting procedure, that
credencewill be less expectedly accurate than a credence arrived at by calibrating.22
20For further discussion, see my (forthcoming).
21For discussion of why ideal agents plausibly aren’t certain of their immunity to cognitive im-
pairment, see, e.g., Christensen (2007).
22The reasoning in this section is adapted from an argument given by Schoenfield (2018: sec. 6),
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Note, to begin, that, in order to represent this available steadfasting procedure
formally, we need to generalize Greaves and Wallace’s notion of an update proce-
dure in a new way: we need to allow procedures that aren’t deterministic, since, if
Aisha expects that she’ll conform to this procedure, she expects that her belief will
be based on the verdict returned by calculations that are subject to random errors
and so doesn’t expect that a given body of evidencewill always result in the same be-
lief. So we can’t represent this steadfasting procedure as a function from evidence
propositions to credal states, but we can represent it as a probability distribution
over functions from evidence propositions to credal states.
To say more about what probability distribution it is, we need to describe the
case in a bit more detail. Let’s suppose, then, that pS(H) = 0.5 and that, for any Xi ∈
Γ, pS(H ∣ X−14∶00∶00i ) = x if Aisha’s (non–hypoxia-affected) calculations based on Xi
return the verdict thatH and pS(H ∣ X−14∶00∶00i ) = 1−x if those calculations return the
verdict that ¬H, where x≫ 0.5. Then, insofar as Aisha’s update procedure involves
setting her credence inH based on the verdict returned by her calculations, without
takingD into account, she’ll respond to gaining E∧D∧ ⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩ by setting pM(H)
equal to x if her (hypoxia-affected) calculations return the verdict thatH and equal
to 1 − x if these calculations return the verdict that ¬H. Now, to say that hypoxia-
affected calculations will return the correct verdict only half the time is just to say
that they will return a verdict at random: H half the time and ¬H half the time. So
we can represent the steadfasting procedure here as a probability distribution such
that the probability of a credal state that assigns x toH is 0.5 and the probability of
a credal state that assigns 1 − x to H is 0.5.
So: what is the expected accuracy, from Aisha’s perspective at 8 pm on Sunday,
of using this procedure to update her credence in H on gaining E ∧D ∧ ⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩?
To answer this question, we need a way of scoring the accuracy, in a world, of an in-
dividual credence rather than a full credence function. Let’s say, then, that A(P, x)
is the accuracy score, in a world where P is true, of a credence of x in P. (Notice
that, insofar as accuracy is understood as any sort of function of a credence’s dis-
tance from the maximally accurate credence—i.e, a credence of 0 in a falsehood or
1 in a truth—it follows that A(P, 1− x) is the accuracy score, in a world where P is
false, of a credence of x in P. We assume here that accuracy is indeed a function of
a credence’s distance from the maximally accurate credence.) We also need a way
of calculating the expected accuracy, in a world w, of the credence in P that is the
outcome of a probabilistic procedure. And this we can calculate straightforwardly,
though she, again, relies on a nonstandard picture of the connection between expected accuracy and
the rational status of update procedures. Part of my reason for adapting this argument is to show
that, in fact, no recourse to Schoenfield’s nonstandard picture is necessary. (This is unsurprising
given the argument in my (forthcoming), the upshot of which is that Schoenfield’s picture and the
standard picture always agree.)
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just by taking the accuracy score, in w, of the credence in P assigned by each pos-
sible outcome of the procedure, weighting that score using the probability of that
outcome, and summing these weighted scores. Or, more formally:
EA(w,P,Π) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
∑p∈D(Π)Π(p) ×A(P,p(P)) if w ∈ P
∑p∈D(Π)Π(p) ×A(P, 1 − p(P)) if w ∉ P
where Π is a probability distribution over credal states and where D(Π) is the do-
main of Π. Finally, we need a way of calculating the expected accuracy, on the
supposition that one will gain some evidenceX between t and t+n, of the credence
in P that is the outcome of updating on X via a probabilistic procedure. We can
calculate this by generalizing our formula for EApt(U) to handle probabilistic up-
date procedures and then applying this generalized formula to a case in which the




pt({w}−n ∣ X−n) × EA(w,P,Π)
where Π is a probability distribution over credal states such that Π(p) is the prob-
ability that the agent, on gaining X, will enter into the credal state p .
With these resources in hand, we can calculate the expected accuracy, from
Aisha’s perspective at 8 pm on Sunday, of using the available steadfasting procedure
to update her credence in H on gaining E ∧D ∧ ⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩, as follows:
EApS(E∧D∧⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩,H,Π) = ∑
w∈E∧D∧⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩
pS({w}−14∶00∶00 ∣ E∧D)×EA(w,H,Π)
So, since the worlds in E ∧D ∧ ⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩ can be divided into those worlds that are
in H and those that aren’t, we have:
EApS(E∧D∧⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩,H,Π) = [pS(H ∣ E∧D)× ∑
p∈D(Π)
Π(p)×A(H,p(H))]+
[pS(¬H ∣ E ∧D) × ∑
p∈D(Π)
Π(p) × A(H, 1 − p(H))]
Now, by stipulation, Aisha’s calculations were performed correctly despite her hy-
poxia, and so we know that non–hypoxia-affected calculations would return the
verdict that H is true. So we know that pS(H ∣ E ∧ D) = x. Furthermore, we know
that, regardless of whetherH is actually true, the result of the available steadfasting
procedure will be that Aisha’s credence in H will be x half the time and 1 − x half
the time. By some substitutions, then, we have:
EApS(E ∧D ∧ ⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩,H,Π) = x × [0.5 ×A(H, x) + 0.5 ×A(H, 1 − x)]+
(1 − x) × [0.5 × A(H, 1 − x) + 0.5 × A(H, 1 − (1 − x))]
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So, simplifying, we have:
EApS(E ∧D ∧ ⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩,H,Π) = 0.5 ×A(H, x) + 0.5 ×A(H, 1 − x)
So the expected accuracy, from the perspective of pS, of Aisha’s using the available
steadfasting procedure to update her credence inHwhen she gainsE∧D∧⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩
is given by this formula.
Note also that the expected accuracy, from the perspective of pS, of a fourteen-
hour-later credence of x inH is just given by a weighted sum in which the accuracy
score of that credence in a given world is weighted by Aisha’s confidence, at 8 pm
on Sunday, that that world will be actual in fourteen hours. Or, more simply, since
the accuracy score of a credence in H in a world is just a function of whether H is
true in that world:
EApS(x,H) = pS(H) ×A(H, x) + pS(¬H) ×A(H, 1 − x)
And since pS(H) = pS(¬H) = 0.5, we have:
EApS(x,H) = 0.5 ×A(H, x) + 0.5 ×A(H, 1 − x)
So, since Aisha assigns accuracy scores in a strictly proper way, we know that
EApS(x,H) is maximized when x = 0.5.
But notice: our formula for EApS(E ∧D ∧ ⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩,H,Π) and our formula for
EApS(x,H) are the same, and so, since the latter is maximized when x = 0.5, we
know that the former is maximized when x = 0.5 as well. So the available steadfast-
ing procedure, on which x ≫ 0.5, doesn’t maximize expected accuracy: instead,
Aisha will maximize expected accuracy if x = 0.5, which is to say that she’ll max-
imize accuracy if, on gaining E ∧ D ∧ ⟨C14∶00∶00S ⟩, she sets her pM(H) equal to 0.5
regardless of what verdict is returned by her calculation. Or, in other words, she’ll
maximize expected accuracy if she calibrates. So it appears that our conclusion in
§4 was correct after all.
7 The eternal relevance of mutation: Concluding remarks
We’ve arrived, then, at the main results of this paper. The thesis that agents should
update their beliefs via the available procedure that maximizes expected accuracy
does indeed entail that agents should calibrate in the face of higher-order evidence.
Furthermore, accepting this fact doesn’t require abandoning a Bayesian approach
to belief update: any Bayesian approach that’s generalized in such a way as to pro-
vide a reasonable treatment of the dynamics of self-location will thereby be com-
patible with calibrationism.
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It turns out, though, that these results have an implication that’s somewhat sur-
prising, and so we’ll conclude with a mention of this implication and its bearing
on another debate about the dynamics of self-location.
Bradley (2011) distinguishes between two kinds of evidence acquisition: discov-
ery, inwhich an agent gains new information about something aboutwhich shewas
previously uncertain, and mutation, in which an agent changes her state of infor-
mation by tracking changes in the truth values of propositions over time. Evidence
propositions that aren’t temporally self-locating—i.e., evidence propositions that
are eternal—don’t change in truth value over time and so can only be acquired by
discovery. But temporally self-locating evidence propositions, such as the proposi-
tion that the clock now reads 3 pm, can be acquired in either way: an agent might
gain this evidence by glancing at the clock, having completely lost track of what
time it is, or she might gain it by staring at the clock as it ticks over from 2:59 pm.
One important difference between discovery and mutation, Bradley says, is
that, unlike discovery, mutation is never relevant to one’s eternal beliefs, in the
sense that, when one gains new evidence by mutation, it’s never rational to re-
spond to that evidence by changing one’s credences in eternal propositions. And
this entails that, in the famous Sleeping Beauty problem, Beauty’s credence that the
coin landed heads, on waking, should be 0.5, since (i) it’s uncontroversial that her
credence should be 0.5 at the start of the experiment, (ii) the only new evidence
she gains on waking is gained by mutation, and (iii) the proposition that the coin
landed heads is eternal.
Bradley’s argument for the claim that mutation is never relevant to eternal be-
liefs is that only if this claim is true can we can maintain that conditionalization
as standardly formulated is the only update procedure that governs eternal beliefs,
and “giving up a principle as defensible and reasonable as conditionalization is a
heavy cost” (2011: 408).This appears to be whatmotivates his halfer position about
the Sleeping Beauty problem, and it also appears to be what motivates him to reject
as insufficiently unconvincing a variety of arguments given by thirders the conclu-
sions of which entail that mutation is eternally relevant.23 It turns out, though, that
the results at which we’ve arrived here make available a novel argument for the
eternal relevance of mutation.
Consider a slightly altered version of Aisha’s case, one in which, at 8 pm on
Sunday, she already knows everything that’s going to happen to her over the next
fourteen hours. That is, the experiences she has over those fourteen hours are the
same as in the original case, but they don’t give her any new evidence other than
evidence about where she is in time, since she knows in advance that she’s going
23In replying to the argument given by Elga (2000), for instance, he says the following: “Keep
in mind that Elga is arguing that we should do something radical i.e. substantially revise our best
theory of confirmation, so we should require a strong argument to do so” (2011: 405).
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to have those experiences. This is a paradigm case of mutation: between 8 pm on
Sunday and 10 am on Monday, she doesn’t learn anything about which she was
previously uncertain but simply tracks changes in the truth values of certain propo-
sitions. So it follows, on Bradley’s view, that her credences in eternal propositions
shouldn’t change during that time. In particular, pM(H) should be equal to pS(H).
This is precisely the result delivered by shifted conditionalization.24 But for rea-
sons we’ve already seen, shifted conditionalization isn’t an available procedure, nor
is any other procedure that delivers this result—Aisha, on Sunday, expects that
she’ll be hypoxic and so will be unable to reliably complete the calculations under-
lying her earlier credence inH, and she also expects that she won’t be able to access
this earlier credence directly, since she either doesn’t explicitly perform any calcu-
lations on Sunday or is unable on Monday to trust the memories she seems to have
of the results of these earlier calculations. In short, the argument of §6 works in this
altered version of Aisha’s case in just the sameway as it does in the original case: the
considerations in favor of calibrating aren’t in any way sensitive to whether Aisha
knows E ∧D in advance.
This altered version of Aisha’s case, then, is a counterexample to the thesis that
mutation is never relevant to eternal beliefs.25 So, insofar as attachment to Sleeping-
Beauty halferism is motivated by a desire to maintain that thesis, this attachment
is simply unwarranted.
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